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Abstract
Autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) are highly complex electromechanical systems which
act in a hazardous, unstructured environment. The AUR Lab of NTNU operates one REMUS
100 AUV and several other unmanned underwater vehicles in Norway’s fjords. In order
to minimize the risk, inherent to these operations, a risk management system should be
developed.
This thesis summarizes the findings during development. The risk management process and
the framework document are based on ISO 31000 (2009). In the course of the development,
an exemplary risk assessment was carried out. The aim of the risk assessment was to assess
the risk of loss of the AUV and unplanned mission abort. The assessment described is one of
the first to use human risk analysis in connection with reliability analysis of AUV. Besides
human reliability assessment, fault tree analysis, event tree analysis and expert estimation
were the main methods used to assess the risk.
The results of the risk assessment were unsatisfying. The risk found seems to be overesti-
mated, this can be accounted to some of the methods used, the low experience with these
methods and the low experience in general with AUV operation. The methods applied seem
to be suitable in most cases but some require modifications for future use. Despite the low
confidence in the data obtained, the recommendations made, are assumed to be helpful to
improve operation. The main recommendations are improved or newly written procedures
for maintenance, planning of missions and fault recognition and solving.
The risk management framework still has to be reviewed by the heads of the AUR Lab.
Thus it will be subject to changes and improvements. Nonetheless it is assumed that the risk
management framework presented here is a good starting point to introduce a successful risk
management system in the AUR Lab.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV1) are complex underwater robots, getting increas-
ingly interesting for use in commercial applications. Development of AUV started before the
1960s (Yuh et al., 2011), mainly driven by the technological challenge. Applications were
mainly found in the military and scientific environment; conducting surveys and counter-
acting mines. With the beginning of the 2000s AUV were becoming available also for the
offshore business by private manufacturers (Yuh et al., 2011). Today applications are seafloor
mapping, capturing of Meso-scale geophysical data, monitoring and capturing of biological
and chemical properties and inspection of structures, among others (Yuh et al., 2011). In
order to be more cost efficient, operations are becoming more autonomous and more com-
plex, enabling AUV to carry out also long time missions and intervention work (NFA, 2012,
AMOS, 2013).
The oceans in which AUV operate are challenging with a corrosive environment, rapidly
changing current and weather conditions. A fault or damage during operation, transport,
deployment or retrieval, might lead to the loss of the vehicle. To reduce the probability of
loss, it is beneficial to know the risk and propose measures to mitigate it.
For the Norwegian University for Technology and Science Trondheim (NTNU) the topic is
also of high relevance because of the new established center of excellence for Autonomous
Marine Operations and Systems (AMOS). AMOS conducts research to increase autonomy of
AUV and improves their functional possibilities. For educational and scientific purposes, but
also as contractor to the maritime industry NTNU employs AUV to demonstrate, test and
advance technology. The AUV are managed by the Applied Underwater Robotics Laboratory
(AUR Lab) at NTNU and are also subject to the challenges mentioned. The health safety and
environment (HSE) regulations of NTNU for fieldwork, field-course, research cruise, on-site
inspection and excursion (HMSR-07, 2006) requires that during preparation of an excursion,
a risk assessment is carried out, to identify all hazards. Eventually measures shall be proposed
to mitigate the risk. So far, no system is in place to fulfill this purpose.
1The term AUV will be used throughout the document for both singular and plural
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1.2. Research question
Aim of the thesis is to develop a risk management system, adapted to the needs of the
AUR Lab for the REMUS 100. The system shall provide tools, guidance and reference for
future use. Exemplary and as basis for the management system, a risk assessment shall be
conducted, covering the risk of loss of the AUV and mission abort.
1.3. Scope and limitations
The development of the management system shall be based on current procedures, standards
and regulations. The risk assessment performed in this thesis shall be used as initial point to
find suitable methods, which will be recommended for further use in the management system.
The procedures should be generally applicable to other underwater vehicles of NTNU. For the
analysis operations are considered, that are planned and will be carried out in the first half
of 2014. Future missions with different operational conditions, such as under ice missions,
cannot be covered. More specific limitations and assumptions are outlined along with the
methods.
1.4. Thesis structure
In the following chapter the methods used will be explained. Chapter 3 will give a description
of AUV and the system in concern and delve into the limitations outlined above. This will
be followed by a short discussion of recent literature on the topic. The successive chapter
will then present the results of the risk assessment and the resulting management process,
followed by a discussion of these findings. Finally the last chapters will draw a conclusion and
issue recommendations in respect to the management process, actual operation and general
issues.
2
2. Methodology
This chapter contains three parts. Firstly the most important terms, which will reoccur
throughout the thesis, will be presented. In the second part the methods used for the risk
management process and subsequently for the risk assessment are described. Its structure
follows the recommended pattern from ISO 31000 (2009). The last part describes how the
risk management framework is developed.
2.1. Definitions
2.1.1. Risk
A very broad definition of risk is given by ISO 31000 (2009):
“Effect of uncertainty on objectives”
Whereas effect is a deviation from the expectations. Another more distinct definition is given
in NORSOK Z-013 (2010):
“Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that
harm”
Rausand (2011) defines risk in another way, which is thought to be more suitable here and
more comprehensible.
“[Risk is] the combined answer to three questions: (1) What can go wrong? (2)
What is the likelihood of that happening? What are the consequences? (3)”
The risk picture then represents the risk qualitatively and shows the dimensions and elements
of risk (Rausand, 2011). This shall give the total picture of hazards, associated consequences
and likelihood.
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2.1.2. Hazard
A hazard is a “potential source of harm” (NORSOK Z-013, 2010). The harm may be “loss
of life, damage to health, the environment, or assets, or a combination of these” (NORSOK
Z-013, 2010). A hazardous event describes the event when a hazard is released (NORSOK
Z-013, 2010).
2.1.3. Reliability
ISO 8402 (ISO 1994) defines the term reliability as:
“The ability of an item to perform a required function under stated conditions
for a stated period of time.”
In addition it can be used as:
“[...] A reliability characteristic denoting a probability of success or a success
ratio.”
Quantitative measures for reliability are reliability (survivor) functions expressed mathemat-
ically as R(T). Important functions in reliability engineering for modeling of failure behavior
are among others; the exponential distribution, the Weibull distribution and the normal
distribution (Rausand and Høyland, 2004).
The probability of failure F(T) is expressed as F(T) = 1 - R(T) These functions will not be
further explained here but more information can be found in the literature, e.g. Rausand
and Høyland (2004).
Failure and fault
A failure is defined as:
“Termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function.”(NORSOK
Z-016, 1998)
A failure is therefore an event. After a failure occurred the item has a fault, which is then the
state of the item. A fault is often the result of a failure but may exist without one (NORSOK
Z-016, 1998). A fault can be defined as:
“State of an item characterized by inability to perform a required function, ex-
cluding the inability during preventive maintenance or other planned actions, or
due to lack of external resources.” (NORSOK Z-016, 1998)
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Faults and failure are important in connection with reliability and risk in AUV operation,
since frequent failures imply a low reliability. A low reliability might increase the probability
of loss, thus increasing the risk.
Barriers
Barriers are defined as physical or engineered systems or human actions (based on specific
procedures or administrative controls) that are implemented to prevent, control, or impede
energy released from reaching the assets and causing harm (Rausand, 2011). Barriers are
also known as risk mitigating measures or risk control measures (RCM).
2.1.4. Risk management
Risk management is the framework or architecture, procedures and processes, of how to man-
age risk. Whereas managing risk is the process of applying the framework to particular risks
(ISO 31000, 2009). The risk management process comprises five steps which are interlinked.
These steps are “establishing of context”, “risk assessment”, “risk treatment”, “communica-
tion and consultation” and “monitoring and review”. The latter two link the steps together
and assure continuous improvement of risk (ISO 31000, 2009). The process described in ISO
31000 (2009) is depicted in fig. 2.1. Communication and consultation takes a major role, it
shall ensure that experts from different fields are consulted to ensure identification of all risks
and hazards.
Establishing the context is the process during which scope, purpose and goals are described.
Risk assessment consists of three steps: Risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation.
During risk identification hazards are reviewed and the possible harm is identified. Risk
analysis identifies mechanisms, how the hazards might manifest and if the risk is relevant in
the established context. Risk evaluation identifies the level of risk and gives input for decision
making and risk treatment (ISO 31000, 2009).
During risk treatment measures are identified to reduce the risk of relevant risk contributors.
The principle that risk should be reduced, as long as it can be proven that the associated
effort is disproportional high, should always be applied (ISO 31000, 2009). Through the
constant process of monitoring and review, the risk level should be constantly reduced. By
reassessing the risk with the knowledge and experienced gained in the meantime, better and
new ways of risk mitigation can be found.
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Figure 2.1.: Risk management process (ISO 31000, 2009)
2.2. Risk management process
2.2.1. Establish context
This part is a detailed exposition of the aims, scope, limitations and criteria. It is based on
internal and external context (ISO 31000, 2009). Internal context can be found in the internal
environment of the organization, in this case the AUR-Lab. It comprises inclusion of existing
structures, procedures and the structure. The external context covers laws, regulations and
other requirements from others, as well as the technical, natural, economic and financial
environment (ISO 31000, 2009).
The context will be established through close communication with key personnel at AMOS
and in the AUR Lab, to ensure a comprehensive foundation for this part. As reference
guideline ISO 31000 (2009) will be used. The Context document can be found in the electronic
appendix, it is not attached here, since all the information contained within the document
can be found in this thesis.
2.2.2. Risk assessment
Risk in context with operation of AUV is connected with various hazardous outcomes. This
includes loss of life and damage to health of operators, other personnel and third party peo-
ple, or loss or damage to the AUV and other AUV, when operated as swarm. Furthermore
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a consequence that could be considered is damage to the environmental resulting from con-
tact between AUV and sub sea production facilities. These are very broad considerations,
therefore risk in respect to loss of the vehicle, damage to the vehicle and a mission abort will
be considered. Risk to the environment, arising from the loss of the vehicle is judged to be
negligible, due to the low environmental impact of the vehicle itself. Additionally the AUV
will not be operated near offshore or sub-sea facilities. The risk of loss of life and damage to
health will be neglected since this is thought to be under control. Nonetheless these should
be considered in a separate risk assessment.
Regionally the case study will focus on Norway, more specifically on Trondheimsfjord. This
does not exclude other regions in Norway, such as Spitsbergen. The region itself is not this
important, more the conditions that can be present such as ice coverage or excessive currents.
Operations are not only dependent on place but also on time. Several phases of operation
have to be accounted for, with different conditions and varying focuses. The phases of interest
are storage and transport, preparation and deployment, mission start and mission, retrieval
and post-dive activities. A description of the different phases can be found in chapter 3.3.3.
The analysis is limited to a functional level of major components. In fig. 2.2 the subsystems
of concern and the influences that are taken into account are summarized. Additionally it is
assumed that personnel are trained in the use of the AUV and that the procedures, given in
the REMUS 100 user manual, are followed. This does not exclude that there might be errors
or mishaps during operation. Another fact that should be kept in mind is that, so far, few
REMUS 100 AUV have been lost. No loss or critical incidents have occurred at NTNU. Thus
a too conservative estimation must be avoided.
Hardware damages is a wide time term therefore the interpretation in this thesis shall be
briefly explained. It comprises internal and external damage. External damages are assumed
to cover damages to the hull, propeller and fins. This includes these parts being broken off,
chipped or cracked. Additionally it includes leakages to the inside, through broken seals,
or similar. Internal damages are assumed to cover broken hardware inside the AUV, loose
connections or internal corrosion. Summarized damages are meant, which are not recognized
before deployment, might lead to loss of the vehicle.
2.2.3. Risk identification
For identification of risks and hazards a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) for each phase
will be carried out. The main function of a PHA is to identify the hazards and assess the
relevant risks, in order to support the following risk assessment. This method is typically
applied in the preliminary system design phase and basically reviews the energies or hazardous
materials released in an uncontrolled manner (Rausand, 2011). Hazards are identified based
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on relevant literature (e.g. Griffiths et al. (2003, 2009), Kirkwood (2009), Manley (2007),
Podder et al. (2004), Christ and Wernli Sr (2007)), hazard checklists (e.g. Rausand (2011)),
experience and judgment by the operators and personnel in the AUR Lab (M. Ludvigsen,
F. Volden, R. Staven and M. Candeloro), the procedures for AUV handling and operation
currently in place, and supplier information (e.g. Hydroid, 2013).
Figure 2.2.: Subsystems and interactions taken into account for the risk assessment
The findings are summarized in a PHA worksheet where the hazards, preceding causes,
resulting consequences and possible mitigating measures are identified. A general layout for
a PHA sheet, which will also be used in this thesis can be found in Rausand (2011, p. 229).
The worksheet also contains an estimation of the risk. Frequency or likelihood (abbreviated
with Freq) and consequences (Cons) are sorted in categories.
These are described in tab. 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. The categories are adaptions for this
risk assessment from Rausand (2011) and are easily adaptable to other assessments. The
preliminary risk is found by adding frequency and consequences together, the so called risk
priority number (RPN). A high RPN corresponds to a high risk. The estimations of frequency
and consequences are based on a subjective assessment and only reflect partly measured data.
The use of categories is a rough estimation (Rausand, 2011) and the worst cases are assumed.
A detailed analysis of frequencies and possible outcomes is carried out during the risk analysis.
The results can be summarized in a risk matrix, exemplary shown in tab. 2.3.
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Table 2.1.: Frequency/ likelihood categories used in the PHA (based on Rausand, 2011)
Category Rating Frequency Description
Fairly normal 5 10 - 1 Event that is expected to occurfrequently
Occasional 4 1 - 0,1 Event that happens now and then andwill normal be experienced
Possible 3 10−1-10−3 Rare event, but will possibly experienced
Remote 2 10−3-10−5 Very rare event that will not necessarilybe experienced
Improbable 1 10−5- 0 Extremely rare event
Table 2.2.: Consequence categories used in the PHA
Category Rating Description
Loss of AUV 3
The AUV is not able to surface, can not be
retrieved or is so severely damaged that further
use is impossible
Severe damage of
AUV and/ or
mission cruise abort
2
The AUV is damaged so severely that a
mission/ cruise has to be aborted or is not
started or all data collected is lost
Small damage to
AUV/ loss of some
mission data
1
The AUV is only damaged slightly and can be
repaired during the cruise, within a short time,
or data is lost only partially
Table 2.3.: Risk matrix
Frequency Improbable Remote Possible Occasional FairlynormalConsequence
Loss of
AUV 4 5 6 7 8
Severe
damage/
Mission
abort
3 4 5 6 7
Small
damage 2 3 4 5 6
2.2.4. Risk analysis
From the PHA (c.f. chapter 5.1) two main hazardous events have been identified; “Damage
to the vehicle, which is undetected before the mission” and “Wrong planning or faulty set up
of the vehicle”. These two hazardous events will be further analyzed with fault tree analysis
(FTA) and event tree analysis (ETA). In a first step the events identified in the PHA are
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connected in a logical way, according to the analysis type. Secondly the level of complexity is
reduced and redundant events eliminated, by grouping of similar events to reasonable events.
Not considered for the moment are collisions with other vehicles or vessels and the risk of
ignition of the vehicle’s battery. These events are considered very unlikely.
Not much statistical data is available for AUV reliability and safety. Thus the probabilities
for all the basic events in FTA and ETA have to be found in a different way. The methods
that will be used are evaluation of the fault logs, use of published data for similar systems,
expert estimation and human reliability analysis (HRA). An overview of the different models
and analysis techniques used for different aspects of the risk assessment are shown in fig. 2.3.
Figure 2.3.: Models used for the determination of basic event probabilities
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Fault tree analysis
FTA is a tool to identify all combinations of basic events that may result in a critical event for
the system (Rausand, 2011). In this case it will be used to analyze the interactions between
the events identified in the PHA leading to the hazardous events, mentioned above.
The analysis is a graphical method based on Boolean logic and event gates. The most
important gates are “and - gates” - the event happens if all sub events occur - and “or -
gates” - the event happens if one of the sub events occurs. With the graphic representation
of the interaction of the basic events it is easily possible to identify short comings in the
system (Rausand, 2011). In a quantitative analysis it is possible to calculate the top event
probability. Basic events are the lowest events considered in the FTA and represent a certain
resolution of analysis (Rausand, 2011). The top event is described by a combined answer to:
What happens in the event? Where does it take place? At which time? (Rausand, 2011).
In a FTA only one top event at a time can be analyzed. Additionally multiple failures at a
time can only be included, if a basic event is created for this purpose. This will not be done
in this case, since the interactions are quite complex and focus will be on the single events
occurring.
For the FTA the tool CARA Fault Tree v.4.02b is used. With the program, fault trees can
easily be drawn with standard symbols and their logic already stored in the library. After
the fault tree is drawn and all reliability, fault or frequency data is entered, the top event
probability can be calculated. For calculation of the top event probability Q0(t), CARA
uses the approximation formula given in eq. 2.1. Where Qˇj(t) is the probability of failure
of a minimal cut set, calculated in eq. 2.2. It is assumed that the basic events (qi(t)) are
independent from each other. A cut set is a combination of basic events that will lead to the
occurrence of the top event. It is considered minimal if non-consideration of one event would
not lead to the top event (Rausand and Høyland, 2004).
Q0(t) ≈ 1−
k∏
j=1
(1− Qˇj(t)) (2.1)
Qˇj(t) =
∏
iKj
qi(t) (2.2)
Event tree analysis
Similarly to FTA the events that occur after the hazardous event can be analyzed and different
outcomes be assessed. For this analysis ETA is used. ETA is a graphical approach which is set
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up left to right, whereas it starts from the hazardous events and splits at stages. The stages
are often described as barrier failures (Rausand, 2011) but can also be significant events that
may arise during an event chain. The event is either true or false, associated with a certain
probability each. In a graphical way a true barrier failure propagates horizontal, where the
false event branches downwards. On the right side of the event tree the consequences and the
cumulative probability are listed, representing the risk arising from the specific hazardous
event. For the whole analysis it is considered that only one event path can occur at a time.
So if the vehicle is damaged, a fault in the navigational system is not considered, although
this is possible. This is done for simplification, considering all possible event combinations
would lead to a highly complex analysis with low readability.
The Event trees are drawn in Microsoft Excel, including the calculations for end event prob-
abilities. The end event probabilities in an ETA are found by multiplying the probabilities
along the event path with each other. The sum of all end event probabilities equals the
probability of the hazardous event.
Evaluation of fault logs
In order to find out what faults occur in the system during a mission, the mission logs of
the missions conducted, so far, are evaluated. For this purpose the fault logs were exported
from the mission logs with the control tool of the REMUS 100 - Hydroid REMUS VIP. The
missions that will be evaluated are:
• Seven missions conducted between 17. and 24. January 2014 in a fjord near Ny-Ålesund
Spitsbergen, Norway
• One mission conducted on 10. March 2014 in Trondheimsfjord near Hommelvik, Norway
• Four missions conducted between 08. and 10. April 2014 in Trondheimsfjord near
Skogn, Norway
In the evaluation only the faults will be considered that occurred during the mission, so after
deployment and before retrieval. Recurring similar faults are grouped to limit the number of
different faults to a reasonable level. After evaluation of all fault logs, the faults are assessed
for their importance and relevant faults are identified. Since only few missions have been
conducted yet, the data is not statistically satisfying, so no probabilistic conclusions should
be drawn directly. On the other hand some insight on mission preparation can be found and
thus give hints for improved operation.
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Human reliability
HRA is a technique to systematically identify and evaluate errors that are likely to happen
when personnel act in a system (Rausand, 2011). Human error is defined as:
“An out-of-tolerance action or deviation from the norm, where the limits of accept-
able performance are defined by the system. These situations can arise from prob-
lems in sequencing, timing, knowledge, interfaces, procedures, and other sources.”
(NUREG/CR-6883, 2005)
Correspondingly human error probability (HEP) is defined as:
“A measure of the likelihood that plant personnel will fail to initiate the correct,
required, or specified action or response in a given situation or by commission
will perform the wrong action. The HEP is the probability of the human failure
event.” (NUREG/CR-6883, 2005)
In connection with HEP, performance shaping factors (PSF) are often mentioned. A PSF is:
“A factor that influences human performance and HEPs. Performance-influencing
factors may be external to humans or may be part of their internal characteristics.”
(Rausand, 2011, instead of PSF the term performance-influencing factor is used)
For the estimation of HEP in this thesis, the SPAR-H (Standardized Plant Analysis Risk
Human Reliability Analysis) method, described in NUREG/CR-6883 (2005), is used. The
model is using PSF to account for situational influences on the person which carries out
tasks. Two kinds of tasks are differentiated - diagnosis and action. Both are given a nominal
HEP (NHEP), NHEP = 0,01 and NHEP = 0,001 respectively. A diagnosis task is based on
knowledge and experience to fully understand the situation, plan and determine the course
of actions. Action tasks are based mainly on the diagnosis task and involve carrying out
work according to procedures or guidelines. A dependency of these two task types can be
modeled if one task involves both actions. To find the HEP two formulas are used, normally
eq. 2.3 is used, if more than three PSF >1 are used eq. 2.4 is used. In tab. 2.4 and tab. 2.5
a list of all PSF is given, a detailed description can be found in NUREG/CR-6883 (2005).
The information is taken from the at-power worksheets, which represent a normal working
operation and thus are believed to have adequate factors, suitable for this thesis.
HEP = NHEP ·
∏
(PSF ) (2.3)
HEP = NHEP ·
∏(PSF )
NHEP ·∏(PSF − 1) + 1 (2.4)
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The task failure probability can be modeled by combining the diagnosis task and action task
HEPs. First the probability of task failure without formal dependency (Pw/od) is calculated
by eq. 2.5. For determination of the probability of task failure with formal dependency (Pw/d),
firstly the degree of dependency has to be determined, c.f. tab. B.1, in the appendix. With
the degree known the probability can be found with the respective equation given in tab. 2.6.
Table 2.4.: PSF in the SPAR-H method (Part 1) (NUREG/CR-6883, 2005)
PSF PSF Levels MultiplierDiagnosis Action Diagnosis Action
Available
time
Inadequate time P(F) = 1
Barely adequate
time (≈ 2/3x
nominal)
Time available ≈
time required
10
Nominal time 1
Extra time (between
1 and 2x nominal or
> 30 min)
Time available ≥ 5x
time required
0,1
Expansive time (> 2
x nominal and > 30
min)
Time available ≥
50x time required
0,01
Insufficient information 1
Stress/
stressors
Extreme 5
High 2
Nominal 1
Insufficient information 1
Complexity
Highly complex 5
Moderately complex 2
Nominal 1
Obvious diagnosis - 0,1 -
Insufficient information 1
Experience/
Training
Low 10 3
Nominal 1
High 0,5
Insufficient operation 1
Pw/od = DiagnosisHEP +ActionHEP (2.5)
Being developed for event sequences in the nuclear industry it is assumed that the SPAR-H-
method still applies here for two reasons. An AUV is also a complex system which requires a
certain level of skill and wrong decisions can easily lead to an undesired outcome. Secondly
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the method can model, through the use of PSF, different environments and complexity. A
short summary on how choice of PSF can be biased is given in the next section.
The evaluation itself for the basic events was conducted by Martin Ludvigsen and Frode
Volden, both accustomed with the AUV. Before they filled out the worksheets they were
shortly briefed in HRA assessment and the method. One sheet is filled out for each basic
event which was identified to be suitable for this method. Since the author of this thesis also
has low experience with this method, it cannot be ensured that all details were presented
correctly, despite thorough preparation. The events considered are listed below in tab. 2.7.
Events marked with ETA are used in ETA and were given an abbreviation for easier handling
of the documents. Non-marked events are part of the FTA.
Table 2.5.: PSF in the SPAR-H method (Part 2) (NUREG/CR-6883, 2005)
PSF PSF Levels MultiplierDiagnosis Action Diagnosis Action
Procedures
Not available 50
Incomplete 20
Available, but poor 5
Nominal 1
Diagnostic/
symptom oriented
- 0,5 -
Insufficient information 1
Ergonomics/
HMI
Missing/ Misleading 50
Poor 10
Nominal 1
Good 0,5
Insufficient information 1
Fitness for
duty
Unfit P(F) = 1
Degraded fitness 5
Nominal 1
Insufficient information 1
Work
processes
Poor 2 5
Nominal 1
Good 0,8 0,5
Insufficient information 1
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Table 2.6.: Determination of probability of task failure (NUREG/CR-6883, 2005)
Degree of dependency Equation for Pw/d
Complete dependence 1
High dependence (1 + Pw/od)/2
Moderate dependence (1 + 6 · Pw/od)/7
Low dependence (1 + 19 · Pw/od)/20
Zero dependence Pw/od
Table 2.7.: Events identified for HRA for ETA and FTA event probabilities
Event Description Type
AN (ETA) AUV is not properly monitored duringmission Action
BD (ETA) Unexpected behavior is not detected Diagnosis
DD (ETA) Damage is not detected duringpreparation for deployment Diagnosis
DM AUV is dropped during moving from/ tomaintenance area Action
DrD AUV is dropped during deployment Action
DrR AUV is dropped during retrieval Action
DR Damages are not detected and repaired Diagnosisand Action
DT AUV is dropped during manual transportfrom/ to the vessel Action
FM
AUV is not placed correctly on
workbench and falls off during
maintenance
Action
FS Existing faults of the AUV are not solvedcompletely before deployment
Diagnosis
and Action
LC Local excessive currents and waves arenot considered Diagnosis
MC Maintenance is carried out wrongly Action
NC Battery is not charged sufficiently Action
RF Faults are not recognized duringplanning phase or before deployment Diagnosis
SH Wrong use of software leads to wronglyimplemented parameters Action
TS Transponders are not set up as plannedbefore Action
WB AUV is wrongly ballasted Action
WP Implementation of mission path or mapis done wrongly
Diagnosis
and Action
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Expert estimation
In order to analyze the FTA and ETA quantitatively some expert judgment of probabilities is
needed. Thus a simple process was designed including elements of current practice (Burgman
et al., 2006) and incorporating proven methods (Witteman and Renooij, 2003). But the
process is simplified, since both the author of the thesis as well as the experts are inexperienced
in expert estimation. Previous to the estimation the experts will be introduced to the method
and pitfalls, which might be connected to the elicitation. The experts assigned in this process,
are Martin Ludvigsen and Frode Volden. The events that are analyzed are summarized in
tab. 2.9.
The probabilities are categorized in descriptive categories, which are associated with a certain
probability, c.f. fig. 2.4 (Witteman and Renooij, 2003). Except fifty-fifty which is the 50%
probability mark, all categories are associated with a range of probabilities. The expert
can, as aid for the assessment, express his probability estimation first verbally and then as
percentage, according to the verbal expression.
It shall be noted that this scale is difficult for handling small probabilities, such as 0,1 % and
0,01 %. Thus there is a high uncertainty connected with this assessment. For this reason the
experts are also asked to indicate their level of certainty, c.f. tab. 2.8. The experts are also
asked to give a comment on why they assessed the probability in this way. If the two experts
have a similar assessment, the probability will be used directly. Otherwise it will be tried to
find consensus between the two estimations.
Table 2.8.: Level of certainty assessment
Confidence level Probability range
High Event probability is within ±1 %
Medium Event probability is within ±2 %
Low Event probability is within ±5 %
Expert judgment is easily influenced, in the following list some of the sources for bias will
be presented and shortly explained (Burgman et al., 2006). These biases derive mainly
from psychological issues. The experts were asked to keep them in mind when assessing
probabilities, to avoid bias or overestimation of the probabilities.
• Perception and memory
– Judgments can be influenced by the way a question is formulated. A positive
formulated question might be lower estimated then the question formulated in a
more negative way.
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Figure 2.4.: Probability scale used in the expert estimation (Witteman and Renooij, 2003)
– Events that already have occurred, are often higher estimated than events the
expert never experienced.
• Framing
– Choice can be influenced by the presentation of the question and choice alterna-
tives, negative formulated choices are less likely to be chosen, even if they are the
same as the “positive formulated”.
• Heuristics and biases
– Often the interpretation of a problem leads to an over-interpretation of the given
data, thus leading to an overestimation/ false conclusion that cannot be drawn
directly from the given data.
– Events that recently occurred also tend to influence the choice, thus biasing judg-
ment.
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– Anchoring happens if probabilities are associated to previously obtained data, from
former assessments or suggestions of other experts.
• Overconfidence
– Arises if the expert has more confidence in his estimate than the accuracy allows.
• Values and attitudes
– Expert judgment is influenced by values and attitudes of the experts.
– Values are expressions of preferences for goods/ activities and the moral or ethical
beliefs that lead to these preferences.
• Motivated reasoning, decision bias and distortion
– Predetermined choices can lead to a distortion of the elicitation to justify these
choices.
– A similar phenomena occurs when the experts has interest in the outcome from
use of the data and thus tries to influence the outcome positively.
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Table 2.9.: Events to be estimated by the experts
Abbreviation Event description
Basic events for Fault tree analysis
CV AUV has contact with deployment vessel in water after
deployment or during retrieval and receives damage
TD AUV is damaged during transport in a vehicle (e.g. truck,
airplane,. . .) from TBS to mission location (e.g. Svalbard)
Concerning wrongly implemented ways and planning so that contact
with land or seafloor is very likely
1 AUV does not abort mission automatically if the AUV is
set up wrongly for the mission (e.g. wrong map datum,
high deviations, wrong ballasting)
2 AUV is stuck in seabed and cannot be recovered with
wrongly implemented parameters given that the AUV does
not abort mission because of the faulty mission planning
Concerning damages that can lead to a loss of the AUV, e.g. cracks
(leakage), loose connections (failure of subsystems), etc.
3 Self-tests do not detect damage and abort mission given
that a critical damage is present
4 Vehicle is not able to surface again due to a damage given
that the damage is not detected before deployment
Data from literature
From the evaluation of the fault logs of the AUV, it can be seen that similar faults have
occurred, as described in Griffiths et al. (2009). Thus it is assumed that their estimation for
shallow coastal waters can be applied here for the risk from internal system faults. The risk of
loss itself will be found from figure 7 in Griffiths et al. (2009) (fig. 4.1 (b) in this thesis). The
graph for coastal waters is chosen, the average distance of a mission of the REMUS 100 of
NTNU is used to find the optimist and pessimist estimation of probability of survival. These
two values are then averaged with the arithmetic average. It is assumed that the probability
of loss lies within these bounds. A mission is normally between 20 and 30 km long.
The risk might be evaluated redundant in this way, since internal faults are also parts of the
FTA and ETA. This might lead to an overestimation of the risk of loss. Since few experience
has been gained yet a small overestimation is assumed to be acceptable.
2.2.5. Risk evaluation
Following the risk analysis the risk is evaluated, determining which hazards are most sig-
nificant for the operation. The combined risk found in the evaluation will be represented
graphically and verbally.
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2.2.6. Risk treatment
Risks that are unacceptable high have to be treated with high priority, risks that are in
the limits will be treated as ALARP. This is the abbreviation for “as low as reasonably
practicable” (Rausand, 2011). It means that hazards need control unless it can be shown
that the effort connected with risk reduction is unacceptable high. Since the assessment
presented here is quite coarse all events should be analyzed and methods identified to make
the risk ALARP.
To identify possible RCM the basic events from the analysis are reassessed and high con-
tributors are identified. A re-evaluation of the risk is then based on improved basic event
probabilities. Thus the total impact of all measures can be evaluated. Re-estimation is based
on the authors belief of the improvement. For demonstration purposes only the HRA events
will be reassessed. It is assumed that the chosen measures reduce the corresponding PSF to a
nominal level. The events of concern are changed for each expert in the respective event, the
probabilities are averaged and give the new probability. These probabilities are then changed
in the fault and event trees.
2.3. Risk management framework
In this part the development of the risk management process and how to keep it updated
will be described. It will be based on the outline given in ISO 31000 (2009) and cover the
recommended content. Suggestions for applicable methods in future assessment will be based
on the experiences and steps taken during the risk assessment. Thus it will be possible to
reproduce the assessment, keep the risk assessment updated and apply the risk assessment
process to other hazards and vehicles. In addition ways of communication and reporting of
incidents and risk will be described. Other hazardous sources that should be considered in
the future are also mentioned.
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3.1. General
Some general information on AUV shall be presented first, followed by a short discussion
on autonomy of AUV operation. The last section of the chapter covers a more detailed
description of the REMUS 100 and the operations and usage in the AUR Lab.
The US Navy (2004) generally defines the term UUV, whereas this definition suits in a non-
military context better AUV:
“Self-propelled submersible whose operation is either fully autonomous (pre-programmed
or real-time adaptive mission control) or under minimal supervisory control and
is untethered except, possibly, for data links such as a fiber optic cable.”
An AUV is not directly controlled by an operator and the main source of power is internal.
Communication is done either for data transmission or for mission update of the AUV. AUV
do not have a permanent connection, through a tether, sound or RF to the main operation
base. AUV are normally cigar shaped to reduce drag and make them efficient in propulsion.
They consist of four main parts: payload, energy system, power distribution and propulsion,
and buoyancy and ballast. The payload includes control, data acquisition and storage, as well
as communication and navigation system (Brighenti, 1990). Energy systems today mainly
consist of battery packs (Antonelli et al., 2008), but experiments are made with fuel cells to
increase the energy density in the system (e.g. Yamamoto et al., 2004, Raugel et al., 2010).
Buoyancy foam and ballast are used to balance the system and keep it afloat. In general
AUV are slightly positively buoyant, so they float on the surface or will float back to the
surface in case of a critical fault. A very general setup of an AUV can be seen in fig. 3.1.
There are two types of AUV, self-propelled ones and gliders. Self-propelled AUV have a
propeller or a jet-pump system to move through the water. Gliders are buoyancy driven
versions of AUV which sink or rise and produce propulsion through fins, an example is given
by Wolek et al. (2012). Focus of this thesis is on self-propelled AUV, since the REMUS 100
is such a vehicle. Until recently AUV were not used for manipulation intervention, Yuh et al.
(1998) described such a vehicle, which was successfully tested in 2010 (Yuh et al., 2011).
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Main challenge in autonomous manipulation work is the unstructured environment of the sea
(Yuh et al., 1998).
Figure 3.1.: General layout of an AUV (Brighenti, 1990)
3.2. Autonomy
Autonomy is a very broad term, often used with UUV. In this short section the concept
of autonomy will be examined. The Norwegian society of automatic control (NFA) defines
autonomy as “the ability of a system to achieve operational goals in complex domains, by
making decisions and executing actions on behalf of or in cooperation with humans” (NFA,
2012). An important part inherent in this definition is the last part “on behalf of or in
cooperation with humans”. This shows that there are varying degrees of autonomy, with
different levels of control of the human operator. There are various scales defining levels of
autonomy, no standard definition of categories exists (Insaurralde and Lane, 2012). The US
Navy defined six levels of autonomy, c.f. tab. 3.1. Currently AUV are found in levels three
to five, where the human operator often has the control to abort a mission and has to give
narrow mission definitions beforehand.
3.3. REMUS 100
3.3.1. System description
The REMUS 100, by Hydroid, is designed for coastal areas with depth up to 100 m. With a
diameter of 19 cm, a length of 160 cm and a weight of 31 kg it is a rather small AUV. The
internal energy source is a 1 kWh lithium-ion battery. It enables the AUV to conduct missions
of maximal four to five hours (at 4 kn and 3 kn propulsion speed, respectively). Control of
the motion is done with one directly driven propeller and four fins. The fins are mounted
vertically and horizontally, for yaw and pitch control (Hydroid, 2013). The REMUS 100 is
equipped with an ADCP, CTD sensors, internal position sensors and positioning sensors.
Several other sensors can be added or exchanged. (Hydroid, 2013).
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Table 3.1.: Levels of autonomy as defined by the US Navy (NFA, 2012)
3.3.2. Applications in the AUR Lab
The REMUS 100 of NTNU was acquired at the end of 2013. Hence only few sea trials have
been conducted yet and little experience has been obtained. The vehicle is primarily used for
test and verification of control algorithms, newly developed equipment and scientific research
cruises. Missions are taking place in several locations all across Norway. So far, the AUV
was used on missions in Trondheimsfjord and in the fjords of Spitsbergen. Additionally the
AUR Lab is working with UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), these are used in combination
with AUV as a communication platform for observation missions.
The AUV is normally deployed from a small craft, which allows easy deployment and retrieval.
But this limits the space which is available for corrections and operation. R/V Gunnerus is
also used, which is larger and more space is available. Deployment and retrieval are not as easy
from there, thus a second smaller craft is needed. The AUV itself is stored and maintained
in Trondheim’s biological station (TBS). An office was assigned for these purposes.
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Currently three systems are used for position keeping and control. These are the long baseline
(LBL) system, delivered with the AUV, GPS fixes on the surface and the inertia navigation
system. In order to substitute the LBL sometimes, an ultra-short baseline system (USBL)
- transponder was ordered. A LBL system uses at least two transmitters whose position is
known to the AUV in global coordinates and the position is derived geometrically in the
AUV. The USBL system is normally mounted below a vessel and the position of the AUV
can be determined in relation to this vessel. The global position is then determined from
the coordinates of the vessel. The advantage of the USBL system is that it is not limited in
range, as long as the vessel is close enough to the AUV.
(a) REMUS 100 AUV in its transport box
(b) REMUS 100 AUV at mission start in the sea
Figure 3.2.: The REMUS 100 AUV of NTNU
3.3.3. Phases of operation
A short description of the activities conducted and conditions encountered in the different
phases of operation will be given in the following paragraphs.
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Storage and transportation
This phase comprises all activities connected with storing the vehicle on land, the transport
from the storage to the vessel of operation and maintenance that is carried out while the
AUV is not on a cruise. Vessel maintenance and storage are conducted in TBS. No strong
variations in temperature or other conditions are to be expected. Normally all equipment
needed can be found at TBS.
Transportation of the AUV occurs in a special hard plastic case. For AUV transport rails
are attached to it, which allow an easy handling and prevent movement in the case. Other
equipment, such as mission laptop, transponders, weights for transponders and small spare
parts can be found in a second box which is specially designed for this purpose. Temperature
changes during transport are expected to be within the allowable range.
Preparation and deployment
The preparation and deployment phase involves programming of mission parameters, prepa-
ration of the vehicle for the mission, pre-dive check and the deployment of the vehicle. For
these actions procedures are described in the guidelines in the operation manual for the RE-
MUS 100. This phase takes place on land as well as on board of the vessel. For programming
the vehicle a sheltered area is preferable.
Especially during deployment rough conditions can be present, such as waves, strong wind,
low temperatures and snow and rain. For deployment and retrieval a frame was designed
that fits the AUV. With this frame the crew does not have to lean as far over the boat side.
Mission start and mission
Mission start describes the phase when the AUV is in the water and waiting to get the start
signal and an initial GPS position fix. The mission is the phase during which data are collected
and the purpose of the cruise is fulfilled. Especially at the beginning of the mission, surface
conditions, as mentioned above, have an influence on the vehicle and operation. During the
mission currents have major influence on the AUV, excessive currents can lead to drift, which
cannot be corrected. During the whole phase the density of the water is an important factor,
since the vehicle should be positively buoyant, so that it floats free if stuck on the ground or
floats up if a system break down should occur.
The AUV is monitored during the dive by acoustic messages that it sends. The messages are
received by a tow-fish acoustic transmitter. The Hydroid REMUS VIP - software translates
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the information for the crew on a laptop. Monitoring is done from the work boat, where the
AUV was deployed. A message is send every two minutes with position information and every
four minutes a more detailed report is sent with current vehicle status. If the vehicle should
be monitored from land, it sends regularly messages via the IRIDIUM satellite system. This
is done in cold and harsh regions such as Spitsbergen.
Retrieval and post-dive activities
Actions that are included in these phases are locating the AUV after mission completion or
abort of the mission, picking it up, cleaning it as prescribed, storing it in the transport case
and retrieving the collected data. During this phase also rough conditions can be encoun-
tered: temperatures below 0°C, strong winds and waves. Activities such as cleaning or data
download are executed on board of a bigger vessel (e.g. Gunnerus) or on land.
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4.1. Risk in AUV operations
Concerning risk and reliability of AUV operations only some publications on AUV, mostly
scientifically used and often unique, are available (e.g. Griffiths and Trembanis, 2007, Manley,
2007). The most relevant literature from recent years is presented here. Generally modifi-
cations and upgrades of vehicles often lead to a reduction of reliability in the operations
following right afterward (Griffiths and Trembanis, 2007).
Chance (2003) analyzed the reliability of the Huggins AUV. Since the first use in the beginning
of 2001 to the end of 2002 the average percentage of successful operations increased from an
average of about 20 % to 95 %. A continuous trend of improvement in correlation with
experience was seen. Some major cuts in mission success can be seen when problems with
the battery system or the electronics arose.
Manley (2007) differentiates two kinds of risk connected with AUV - technical risk and opera-
tional risk. Technical risk derives from the system itself. AUV are complex electromechanical
artificial systems, which are in addition becoming more autonomous. The mechanical com-
ponents can fail due to the harsh environment, inferior quality or alike. The software and
mission program can contain faulty code and therefore cause a system failure. All failures
can lead to a loss of the AUV or an abortion of the mission, thus creating a risk.
Manley (2007) highlights the energy supply as major source of risk, since energy is stored
with a high density. Lithium batteries can cause substantial damage if failed. Other energy
sources, mainly in developing states, like hydrogen cells are high risk contributors. Opera-
tional risk derives from the dynamical nature of the ocean and varying weather conditions
during operation (Manley, 2007). Launch and recovery are proven to be the most critical
phases. The AUV can fall during lifting operation, endangering the AUV itself as well as the
operators and crew on board. Even if the AUV is in water there is the risk that it might
get caught in the propeller of the vessel. During recovery similarly there is the danger of
contact between vessel and AUV (Manley, 2007). As conclusion Manley (2007) states that a
thorough evaluation of needs is important to identify the requirements and best strategy to
handle operational risk. For the handling of operational risk an experienced and well trained
operation team is of most importance.
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A simulation based analysis for AUV was carried out by Bian et al. (2009b), this was based
on the fuzzy FTA used already in Bian et al. (2009a). They considered the subsystems nav-
igation, computer, thruster, energy, communications, obstacle avoidance, security detection
and environmental detection. The top event was characterized as “AUV works defectly”, so
not as intended. Since the top event is defined very broadly only or-gates were used, resulting
that every basic event is also a minimal cut set. Analysis was carried out with a Monte Carlo
simulation technique Bian et al. (2009b). The results showed a rather low probability of
survival after some hundred hours of total operation time.
Griffiths and Brito (2008) modeled risk prediction for under ice missions with a scientific AUV
with a Bayesian belief network. This model is based on expert judgment and observations
made previously, as well as of observable features and their probability of encounter. With
this model a probability distribution for the probability of loss of the AUV during an under
sea-ice mission was determined (Griffiths and Brito, 2008). The authors claim that this
approach will become a standard in the AUV offshore industry for under ice operation.
Kirkwood (2009) presents some incidents that happened to MBARI’s autonomous platforms,
including moorings and UUV with respect to interactions with other people. A problem
that reoccurred from time to time was that people got close to the vessel while a ROV was
under water. Due to low maneuverability this might lead to unwanted situations. From the
incidents that happened to the institute’s AUV it can be said that if an AUV is found, because
it drifted ashore, it represents a risk to the people finding it, since it contains batteries. But
it also imposes a risk to the AUV, since it might be opened. Kirkwood (2009) concludes that
the risk of encountering third parties in a mission is increasing, which at least might affect
AUV operations, since there is an increasing probability of losing the AUV by contact with
other marine users.
Griffiths et al. (2009) investigated the fault history of two REMUS-100 AUV which were
used at the Center for Coastal Marine Sciences at California Polytechnic State University.
The AUV were in use at that time from 2001 to 2009 and from 2003 to 2009, in a total
of 186 missions, of which 173 were considered satisfactory successful. In these missions
507 problems were logged, with 37 unique faults or incidents. Seven out of these 37 were
responsible for 92 % of all problems recorded. The expert judgment executed and described
in the article showed that the most reoccurring faults only played a very minor role in the
risk of loss of one of the AUV during a mission. Griffiths et al. (2009) carried out an expert
estimation of survival probabilities, using a modified SHELF approach. The experts were
asked to estimate five measures characterizing the probability of loss, thus the risk. This
assessment was combined with Kaplan Meier plots to find the probability of survival based
on mission length. The found probability plots reflect the experience gained so far, with the
vehicles. The process itself might be biased because faults were categorized and optimistic
and pessimistic judgments not merged, therefore interpretation might also be biased and the
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results viewed optimistic or pessimistic (Griffiths et al., 2009). The survival probability plots
for open water and coastal water are shown in fig. 4.1. The pessimistic estimation was found
to be too negative, since the average expected number of missions until loss was significantly
lower than the total number of missions conducted until now, where no AUV was lost.
(a) Estimation for open waters (b) Estimation for coastal waters
Figure 4.1.: Probability of survival plots based on expert elicitation and encountered faults
of two REMUS 100 AUV (Griffiths et al., 2009)
In Brito et al. (2012) an improved risk assessment was introduced. The assessment for
probability of loss, given a certain fault that was experienced during earlier missions, was
improved. It was based on consensus for the distribution. Similarly a consensus based
assessment of possible mitigation of these faults, was executed. The consensus is based on
the experts discussing and elevating on the faults, the understanding of fault mechanisms and
the effects on the AUV. The process described also includes a review process of risk after the
mission, only taking into account the faults which occurred during the mission (Brito et al.,
2012).
Brito and Griffiths (2011) used their experience with risk assessment and tried to model the
whole deployment process in a Markov chain transition model. The model draws on expe-
rience and expert judgment to develop the transition probabilities from state to state. For
deployment, transport, retrieval, etc., static transition probabilities are used, while the mis-
sion itself is modeled dynamically, depending on mission distance. With the model presented
the risk for a total mission can be assessed, but still the model is full of uncertainties, due to
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lack of data. It is therefore required to reassess and revise failure probabilities and validate
the data after each mission (Brito and Griffiths, 2011).
Another FTA of an AUV was conducted by Xu et al. (2013). They analyzed the reliability of
the 4500M AUV, a Chinese mineral exploration AUV. For this purpose the AUV system was
divided into four levels and 39 basic failure events. The basic events were component failures,
assumed to be distributed by an exponential distribution. For analysis of the tree Monte Carlo
simulation was chosen. In their results, Xu et al. (2013) showed that the probability of the
AUV working for 40 hours is 80,07 %, which is assumed to be satisfactory by the authors.
4.2. Risk management of AUV operations
A proactive and systematic risk management process for AUV was developed by Griffiths
and Trembanis (2007). The process is designed as a framework tool to give AUV owners the
possibility to assess the risk of loss of an AUV. It depends mainly on objective information, but
also requires subjective expert evaluation. The process involves elements and uncertainties
that come along with the handling of autonomous systems (Griffiths and Trembanis, 2007).
The process is split in five steps (Griffiths and Trembanis, 2007):
1. Design of a risk acceptance process, including assignment of risk owner and technical
assessment team
2. Campaign and mission requirements, also used as input for the risk owner
3. How can faults be assessed and the survival probability calculated, including actual
calculation
4. Risk evaluation of calculated risk against risk acceptance criteria
5. Propose risk mitigation strategies, e.g. procedural measures, technical measure, quality
assurance, use of tools is recommended (FMECA, FTA)
If the risk connected with AUV operation is assumed to be too high, although measures have
been taken to reduce it, insurance might be an alternative. Griffiths et al. (2007) presents four
cases in which AUV operations have been insured, they point out the difficulties connected
with establishing a contract and the influencing factors of insurance premium. Two different
kinds of insurance should be considered, insurance against the loss of vehicle or insurance
of the vehicle and cost resulting from the loss, i.e. the unsuccessful mission. In one case
the work with an insurance broker even led to a significant input for improvement of design
and operation of the vehicle. Griffiths et al. (2007) conclude that insurance, especially for
experienced users is a good option to cover the risk of loss, for new users and operators it
might be difficult to obtain insurance.
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The main findings of the risk assessment process and the results of the risk treatment process
will be presented below. Additionally a short summary of the risk management framework
will be given. The documentation and therefore the unabridged results are gathered in
the appendices A (PHA), B (risk analysis), C (risk treatment) and D (risk management
framework).
5.1. Risk identification
The risks that were identified in the PHA are summarized in tab. 5.1. The numbers corre-
spond to the description in the PHA sheet in the appendix. The most concerning risks, with
a ranking of seven and higher are:
• (1-2) AUV falls during moving to/ from maintenance
• (1-6) AUV bumps into objects during transport with crane
• (1-7) AUV is dropped during manual transport on vessel
• (2-1) Wrong mission parameters are implemented during preparation
• (2-2) AUV is not correctly ballasted for operation
• (2-4) AUV is damaged during preparation
• (2-7) AUV has contact with vessel after deployment
• (3-3) Unexpected and unwanted behavior during mission
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Table 5.1.: Risk matrix for all identified hazards
Date: 2014-03
Name/s:
Frequency
Consequence
Loss of AUV
1-3, 2-9, 3-6, 
3-11, 4-5
2-8, 2-12, 3-
1, 3-2, 3-4, 3-
10
2-3, 2-11, 3-
7, 4-3, 4-6
1-6, 1-7, 2-2, 
2-4, 2-7, 3-3
2-1
Severe 
damage, 
Mission abort
1-8, 1-9, 3-5, 
3-8, 3-12, 4-2
1-1, 2-5, 4-4, 
4-8
1-4, 1-5, 2-6, 
4-1
1-2
Small damage 3-9 2-10,  4-7
Study Object: REMUS 100
Ch. Thieme
Risk Matrix
Improbable Remote Possible Occasional Fairly normal
5.2. Risk analysis
5.2.1. Fault log evaluation
During the evaluation a total of 1650 fault messages distributed over 29 faults were recorded
by the AUV in the 12 missions conducted, so far. A graphical summary of the occurrence of
faults is given in fig. 5.1, a description of the events can be found in appendix B.2. The most
reoccurring events are:
1. #8 - 537 faults - Self test failure altitude (tilt), [80000010] pausing mission
2. #10 - 537 faults - Warning compass bias table entry is excessive
3. #12 - 166 faults - Vehicle at low altitude. Executing emergency climb
4. #1 - 147 faults - The ADCP is not sending water current data
5. #7 - 52 faults - Vehicle stuck on surface; attempting to drive it down
6. #5 - 48 faults - Fix needed: Get fix objective
7. #9 - 47 faults - No response from Iridium to command ATH0
8. #19 - 47 faults - Self test failure thruster, [A1020080] pausing mission
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Evaluation of fault logs
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Figure 5.1.: Number of faults per fault type recorded
5.2.2. HRA
The HRA was completely conducted by one of the experts, the second expert could only
assess half of the events. The results are summarized in tab. 5.2. A detailed listing of the
HRA assessment with all PSF can be found in appendix B.3.
5.2.3. Expert estimation
The expert estimation could only be conducted by one expert. For the six events all proba-
bilities and confidence in each estimate was assessed. This is summarized in tab. 5.3.
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Table 5.2.: Summary of the HRA
Abb. Estimation CombinedExpert 1 Expert 2
AN 0,1305 0,0010 0,0658
BD 0,1600 0,0005 0,0803
DD 0,0800 0,0005 0,0403
DM 0,0200 0,0500 0,0350
DrD 0,0020 0,3336 0,1678
DrR 0,0477 0,3336 0,1906
DR 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000
DT 0,0010 0,0050 0,0030
FM 0,0006 0,0010 0,0008
FS 0,6059 1,0000 0,8030
LC 0,0748 n.a. 0,0748
MC 0,0060 n.a. 0,0060
NC 0,0119 n.a. 0,0119
RF 0,2878 n.a. 0,2878
SH 0,1072 n.a. 0,1072
TS 0,0005 n.a. 0,0005
WB 0,0060 n.a. 0,0060
WP 1,0000 n.a. 1,0000
Table 5.3.: Summary of expert judgment on probabilities
Event Probability Confidence
CV 10 % Low
TD 15 % Low
1 5 % Medium
2 1 % Medium
3 3 % Medium
4 2 % Medium
5.2.4. Data from literature
For 25 km missions, the probability of survival was found to be 0,995 from the optimist
estimation and 0,973 for the pessimist estimation. This averages to 0,984 as probability of
survival, the probability of loss for internal faults is thus 1,6 %.
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5.2.5. FTA
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the fault trees drawn for the analysis. The basic event probabilities
found previously were added to the events in CARA Fault Tree. The program then was used
to calculate the top event probabilities. The probability for a “Damaged vehicle before it is
deployed” was found to be 50,76 %. The event probability for a “Wrongly set up vehicle”
was found to be 28,78 %.
University License - NTNU, Norway
Not for commercial use
External/ internal 
damages when AUV
is prepared for 
deployment
And 1
AUV is damaged
Or 1
AUV damaged 
during storage or 
maintenance
Or 3
AUV is dropped 
during moving from/ 
to maintenance area
DM
AUV is not placed 
correctly on work- 
bench and falls off 
during maintenance
FM
Maintenance is 
carried out wrongly
MC
AUV is dropped 
during manual 
transport from/ to 
the vessel
DT
AUV is damaged 
during transport in a 
vehicle from TBS to 
mission location
TD
AUV is damaged 
during deployment 
or retrieval
Or 5
AUV has contact 
with deployment 
vessel in water  and 
receives damage
CV
AUV is dropped 
during deployment 
on deployment 
vessel
DrD
AUV is dropped 
during retrieval on 
retrieval vessel
DrR
Damages are not 
detected repaired 
and before a cruise 
is started
DR
Damage to AUV  P1
Figure 5.2.: Fault tree with top event: “External/ internal damages when AUV is prepared
for deployment”
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University License - NTNU, Norway
Not for commercial use
AUV is wrongly set 
up for mission
And 11
Planning is executed
faulty
Or 11
Mission path is 
implemented 
incorrectly
Or 12
Implementation of 
mission path/ map is
done wrongly
WP
Local excessive 
currents and waves 
are not considered
LC
Transponders are 
not set up as before 
planned and im- 
plemented in AUV
TS
Software is faulty at 
mission start
Or 13
Existing faults of the 
AUV are not solved 
completely before 
deployment
FS
Wrong use of soft- 
ware leads to 
wrongly implement- 
ed parameters
SH
AUV is not set up 
physically correctly 
for mission
Or 14
Battery is not 
charged sufficiently
NC
AUV is wrongly 
ballasted so that the 
mission is inhibited
WB
Faults are not 
recognised during 
planning phase or 
before deployment
RF
Mission Planning: P1
Figure 5.3.: Fault tree with top event: “AUV is wrongly set up for mission”
5.2.6. ETA
Three types of end events were identified in the ETA: Loss of AUV, Mission completed with
faulted/ damaged AUV and mission abort. The event trees are shown in fig. 5.4 and 5.5.
All outcomes and their respective probabilities can be found in the last two columns of the
trees. It is notable that the risk of loss of the vehicle is relatively low in both trees. A more
detailed representation of the total risk is found in the next section.
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Figure 5.4.: Event tree for the start event “External or internal undetected damage, when
the AUV is prepared for deployment”
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Figure 5.5.: Event tree for the start event “AUV is wrongly set up before mission deployment”
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5.2.7. Risk evaluation
Tab. 5.4 summarizes the risk found from the two event trees and the literature data, it
also shows the possibility to have a successful mission. This is better visualized in fig. 5.6.
Accordingly in almost four out of five cases the mission should be aborted and in 1,6 % of
missions the AUV might be lost. Finished mission with fault, in this context means that the
mission was finished without mission abort. The results from such a mission can be expected
to be not totally satisfying.
Table 5.4.: Summary of mission outcomes and associated probabilities
Event Damage Planning Literature Sum
Loss of AUV 1,227·10−5 2,026·10−5 0,016 1,603·10−2
Mission abort 0,5070 0,2858 0,7928
Finished mission with fault 6,014·10−4 2,006·10−3 2,608·10−3
Successful mission 0,1886
Loss of AUV
0,0160
Mission abort
0,7928
Finished 
mission with 
fault
0,0026 Succesful 
mission
0,1886
Figure 5.6.: Probabilities of mission outcomes
5.3. Risk treatment
5.3.1. Proposed measures
From the HRA assessment it became obvious that the operators have a need for better
procedures. Looking at the experience/ training and the procedure PSF reveals the tasks
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where the most problems are seen. The tasks that were identified have a rating in one of the
PSF of low (training/ experience) or poor (procedures). This evaluation showed that there
is need for more guidance in:
• Maintenance of the AUV, especially how to detect damages and repair these
• Planning of the mission in respect to
– Consideration of local environmental loads on the vehicle, such as currents, etc.
– Implementation of way points and mission path in Hydroid REMUS VIP - software
• Fault of the AUV recognition and solving them, during preparation and operation
Thus it is recommended to develop procedures and manuals which are adapted to the needs of
the AUR Lab. For the last point, which includes solving of all faults previous to the mission
and interpretation of fault messages during the mission, it is recommended to build on the
experience of the whole team. A database or document should be created that includes the
fault messages, their meaning and especially how to solve and handle the problem. This
would increase the efficiency during preparation for deployment and facilitate this process.
If all current operators are involved a wide knowledge base can be built and future operators
can profit from this.
5.3.2. Reduced risk
HRA
For the mentioned events in tab. 5.5 the human error probabilities were re-assessed. For these
events the corresponding PSF for procedures was reduced to 1. The table also shows the
new human error probabilities and the reduction of probability. Some events were notably
influenced with a reduction in probability by more than 10 %, whereas others were not
influenced at all.
FTA
The newly found probabilities were used to update the existing fault trees. For the top
event “Damaged AUV before deployment” the probability was reduced to 0,3303. This is
a reduction of about 0,17. Thus it can be assumed a significant improvement. For the top
event “AUV is set up wrongly” the probability was not reduced, this is discussed later.
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Table 5.5.: Reassessed basic event probabilities of the HRA
Abb. First assessment Re-assessment Reduction
AN 0,0658 0,0151 0,0507
DM 0,0350 0,0255 0,0095
DrD 0,1678 0,0465 0,1213
DrR 0,1906 0,0505 0,1402
DR 1,0000 1,0000 0,0000
DT 0,0030 0,0010 0,0020
FS 0,8030 0,8030 0,0000
LC 0,0748 0,0040 0,0708
ETA
By re-evaluation of the event trees the new probabilities for the aforementioned events were
found. They are summarized in tab. 5.6. The complete revised trees can be found in ap-
pendix C.1.
Table 5.6.: Summary of the re-assessed fault trees
Event Damage Planning
Loss of AUV 7,987·10−6 1,988·10−5
Mission abort 0,3299 0,3282
Finished mission with fault 3,913·10−4 1,969·10−3
5.3.3. Risk evaluation
With the reassessed data the risk during a mission is now different. Fig. 5.7 shows the
composition of probabilities for a mission. The probability of a successful mission is improved
by a factor of about 1,5, while the other event probabilities were reduced significantly.
5.4. Risk framework
The risk framework for the AUR Lab was written in accordance with ISO 31000 (2009).
It is designed as a living document. Fig. 5.8 summarizes the interconnections between the
different actors and their roles in the system. The framework itself is the central point of the
management. It is aid to clarify responsibilities, gives assistance in choice of methods and
42
5. Results
Loss of AUV; 
0,0160
Mission abort; 
0,6581
Finished mission 
with fault; 
2,360E-03
Succesful
mission; 0,3235
Figure 5.7.: Probabilities of mission outcome with implemented RCM
helps to record gained experience. A high emphasis was put on cooperation and communi-
cation within the AUR Lab. Such that decisions are made that have the support of all who
are affected by it.
The main components of the risk management framework are listed below. The last two
points should be regularly updated, so that gained experience is saved and accessible for
others working with risk management. The framework document itself is at a point ready
for review by the AUR Lab, due to time limitations that was not possible before completion
of the thesis.
• Short overview over risk management vocabulary
• Implementation of the system
– Clarification of roles
– Communication and cooperation
– Monitoring of risk and review of risk assessments
– Review of the risk management system
• Risk assessment methodology
• Hazards and risks that should be considered
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Figure 5.8.: Roles and links in the risk management system
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In this chapter the results of the risk assessment will be discussed and evaluated.
6.1. Risk identification
The PHA revealed several possible hazardous events, but it can’t be excluded that some
events have not been identified. Through collaboration with personnel involved in operation,
use of reported incidents and checklists the attempt was made to identify comprehensively all
hazardous events. Thus it is believed that the identified events are, at least, the most relevant
ones. The tables in the appendix contain events that are not further discussed here, such as
loss of data. These events were identified when the scope was wider, which was eventually
reduced to the scope presented here.
6.1.1. Risk analysis
Fault log evaluation
In general all logged messages have been evaluated. It cannot be excluded that faults which
are not in the AUV’s database were not recorded, since they were not recognized as such. Of
the fault messages recorded some are mere status messages, which actually are not a fault,
such as “Executing cmd from Digital Tx Bd: Run”. It was found that only 13 of the recorded
fault types were of significance for the safety of the vehicle. Fig 6.1 shows the observed
number of these relevant faults.
It is notable that the faults no. 1, 2, 3 and 4 only occurred during the first mission, which was
a test run, accustoming the operators with the vehicle. Thus the significance of these faults
should not be overestimated, although they occurred quite frequently during the mission.
Faults 18 and 19 only occurred during mission 7, faults 26 and 28 only occurred during
missions 9 and 10 respectively.
The vehicle was stuck a total of 12 times in three missions, while the warning of low altitude
was issued 166 times during almost all missions. This seems most alarming, since in almost
14 % of the cases the vehicle was stuck but, so far, always managed to resurface.
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Figure 6.1.: Relevant recorded faults sorted by fault ID
Fault number 9 should also be kept in mind, the fault is relevant when the mission is depending
on communication via iridium. This was the case during the seven missions in Spitsbergen,
where the weather conditions did not allow a permanent monitoring with the tow fish. Faults
15 and 16 occurred as part of the mission plan, since the mission was continued until a certain
battery level was reached, then it moved to the end position, here it is important, that the
battery level is set high enough that there is enough time for recovery.
HRA
The judgments from the experts differ quite drastically in some events. This might have
several reasons. As mentioned earlier there are some pitfalls connected with expert judgment,
which might lead to an over- or underestimation of influences. As NUREG/CR-6883 (2005)
states, it is possible to interpret the PSF differently. This might have occurred, indications
were observed when clarifying some of the events. This is allowed, but distorts the HRA
since not all PSF have the same weighting factors for the same weighting evaluation.
It is assumed that the averaging of the probabilities from the two experts reduces the uncer-
tainty and the “true value” lies within these two values. Unfortunately only the first expert
could finish the assessment, while the second could only assess half of the events. Thus the
second half of the events might be more biased than the other events.
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Another factor that influences the HRA assessment was the combination of action and diag-
nosis probabilities. The events FS and WP were assessed to have a failure probability of 1,
which means that they will be carried out wrongly in every case. The method for combining
diagnosis and action tasks in general is thought to be good. The description and combina-
tion of the single matrix cells should be changed, since they are not adequate in this case.
In connection with the AUV this assessment will always lead to a total or high dependency.
This might lead to a probability, which is overestimated by several magnitudes. The error
introduced by the mentioned issues, cannot be quantified. It is assumed that it is significant,
which might lead to a wrong focus during assessment of RCM, thus the focus for RCM was
on the PSF, since those reflect where the users see most problems.
Expert estimation
The first evaluation by the experts individually should have been followed by a second group
estimation. Due to time limitations and availability of the experts this was not possible. Only
one expert submitted the worksheet back. A group discussion and assessment would have
removed uncertainty and reduced bias, since the experts would have to find consensus. The
expert, who submitted the probabilities had low or only middle confidence in his evaluation.
FTA
It is assumed that all important basic events were considered, while redundancy was avoided.
Events that were not identified in the PHA, were not included. If hazards were missed, this
mistake could not be corrected.
Concerning the result from the FTA some remarks should be made. Firstly it is notable that
in the fault tree for “Wrongly set up vehicle” the top event probability is solely determined
by the basic event RF. This results from the structure of the tree. Only one “and-gate” is
included, which makes RF a part of every minimal cut set. The other events sum up to a
higher failure probability than 1. Already the basic events FS and WP have F(t) = 1 and will
always occur. Thus only RF is important for the top event probability. This circumstance
can be accounted for by the high event probabilities derived from the HRA, as discussed
earlier.
Similarly, the top event probability for the fault tree “Damaged AUV before deployment” is
governed by the sum of all basic events which are not DR. The basic event DR has a failure
probability of 1, which results from the HRA assessment. Almost all basic events in the Fault
trees were modeled by HRA. Accordingly the HRA assessment has a significant influence on
the top event probabilities. The uncertainty connected with the HRA results therefore in an
accumulation of uncertainty in the FTA.
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ETA
For the ETA it is assumed that the interconnections were modeled sufficiently. A compromise
was taken between many events and a high number of branches, and few events, which might
not reflect real operation sufficiently. In the ETA both HRA and expert estimation have been
used to assess the probabilities. Here the uncertainties of both have a huge influence since
they multiply with each step. The results have therefore to be seen skeptical. It is assumed
that the proportion between loss of the vehicle and mission abort is realistic, whereas the end
result is assumed to be too high. This is discussed next.
Risk evaluation
The risk quantification presented here, has to be beheld with care. As mentioned, the basic
event probabilities are not of high confidence. The confidence interval is hard to determine
in this case. All the methods applied were new to most of the participants and not much
experience had been obtained, in relation to operation and handling of the AUV. In the
offshore industry this would be unsatisfying, but since this thesis represents a demonstration
of methods and overall principle, it is assumed to be acceptable. Interpretations that are
made from the results should be considered carefully.
Regarding the whole risk picture, the probability of loss is within the bounds given by the
pessimist and optimist estimation of Griffiths et al. (2009). The contribution from ETA and
FTA to the risk of loss is comparably low to the risk indicated by the authors. Griffiths et al.
(2009) also stated that the pessimist estimation is probably too low. Because the probabilities
were just averaged from optimist and pessimist estimation, it can be assumed that the risk
of loss is overestimated.
The probability of mission abort is found to be too high, to reflect real operation. The
estimation suggests that about 79 % of the missions will be aborted. So far, during 12
missions conducted, only one was aborted (the AUV was too far away from the planned
path). This is not a statistically satisfying number of missions conducted, but the literature
on AUV supports this as realistic. These high probabilities can be accounted for by too high
probabilities which resulted from the FTA and were the basis for the ETA.
6.2. Risk treatment
For the risk treatment suggestions measures have been selected where the operators saw
most difficulties. Thus it is assumed that the reassessment of probabilities by the experts
48
6. Discussion and evaluation
themselves would have led to a similar result. What was not included was the expected
experience gain in the next months and years of operation. This will supposedly lead to an
additional reduction of basic event probabilities, since PSF would be evaluated differently and
with lower uncertainty. This is especially valid for the HRA, but also an expert estimation
will gain a higher confidence and resulting in a higher quality of the assessment.
In general it is assumed that improved guidance will reduce the risk in the areas mentioned.
The quantification of this gain is difficult due to the lack of reliable data, as was mentioned
earlier. But resulting from the re-assessment a high reduction in risk can be expected. With
the probabilities assessed here mission success would increase by about 15 %. This is sup-
posedly still too low but it shows that a risk reduction is likely.
6.3. Risk framework
The risk framework as described, as result of the executed risk assessment, is to be seen as a
guideline. The framework still needs to be reviewed by the decision makers of the AUR Lab.
So far, all people involved have little experience in risk management and risk assessments,
thus an experience base has to be built. This is reflected in the contents of the framework
documents, which summarizes experiences made and makes suggestions for the future. It is
assumed that the framework is a good starting point to introduce a risk management system
in the AUR Lab.
49
7. Conclusion
This thesis aims at presenting a risk management process for the REMUS 100 of the AUR
Lab at NTNU. It is based on a previously carried out risk assessment, also described in this
thesis. It is believed that a well implemented risk management helps to facilitate operation,
makes it safer, reduces the probability of loss and improves the overall efficiency of operation.
The risk assessment carried out is one of the first to link HRA with AUV operation in order
to find the risk of these operations. Only two aspects of risk in AUV operation are analyzed,
assessments with different aims might help to identify further risk contributors and eliminate
them consequently. From the results of the risk assessment it can be concluded that in the
current operations there is need for new or improved procedures. The procedures should
aim towards maintenance, fault detection and solving and mission planning. More precisely
formulated measures and improvements are presented in the recommendations.
Although the total risk presented here seems to be too high, it is assumed that the methods
are used correctly. Most are well proven while some are only simplified adaptations, due to a
lack of time and experience. Due to the absence of statistical satisfying data the assessment
is based on estimation methods. The standard methods PHA, ETA and FTA seem suitable
for this case. Expert estimation is also a tool, which is very suitable for these kinds of
assessments. It is reckoned that the SPAR-H HRA might not be as suitable as was assumed
initially. Despite the shortcomings mentioned it is assumed that the methods used herein are
a good starting point for application in further assessments. Accordingly a gain in experience
will also help to improve use of the methods and simplify the whole assessment process.
From the fault log evaluation one can conclude that the faults that occurred so far, except
when the vehicle was stuck, are often not critical. But it should be the aim, to find root
causes for all of these faults and eliminate them as far as possible.
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8.1. Further work on the risk management for the AUR Lab
For the risk management presented here to be successful all affected parties have to be involved
in and convinced of the advantages of the risk management system. Key personnel in the
AUR Lab has to be committed and willing to invest time to make it an efficient tool. For this
purpose it is recommended to appoint a risk management responsible. This person should
prepare, conduct, review and involve all relevant people in risk management. He should also
ensure that all relevant risks are covered and new hazards and risks are identified.
Only two elements of risk have been analyzed here. Thus it is recommended that future
risk assessments cover the following outcomes: loss of life, damage to health, damage to the
environment, damage to assets belonging to the AUR Lab and damage to assets of third
party people. A more detailed list of possible outcomes of concern and hazards is presented
in the risk framework document.
In general, it is assumed that the methods proposed here, such as ETA, FTA, PHA, HRA,
etc., can be used, but some comments in respect to their use will be made. For the HRA it
is recommended to find a better method to model dependency between action and diagnosis.
Additionally the PSF should be described adapted to the vocabulary and circumstances of
AUV operation. These two aims can be achieved by using a different, more generic method
or by adapting the method which was used here.
From the HRA it can be seen that the operators of the AUV need more guidance in:
• Maintenance of the AUV, especially how to detect damages and repair these
• Planning of the mission in respect to
– Consideration of local environmental loads on the vehicle, such as currents, etc.
– Implementation of way points and mission path in Hydroid REMUS VIP - software
• Fault of the AUV recognition and solving them, during preparation and operation
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Thus it is recommended to develop procedures and manuals which are adapted to the needs
of the AUR Lab. These should be written both in English and Norwegian, in this misun-
derstandings can be partly avoided. For the last point, which includes solving of all faults
previous to the mission and interpretation of fault messages during the mission, it is recom-
mended to build on the experience of the whole team. A database or document should be
created that includes the fault messages, their meaning, how to solve the fault and behavioral
advice. This would increase the efficiency during preparation for deployment and facilitate
this process. If all current operators are involved, a wide knowledge base can be built and
future operators can profit enormously.
The fault logs revealed that a lot of failure messages are generated during one mission. Thus
the AUR Lab should monitor the fault logs, find the basic reasons for faults and try to
eliminate them as far as possible. This will not only reduce the number of fault messages
but also help in the process of setting up the vehicle for a mission. This also complies with
record keeping of experience, mentioned above.
Two more things that were seen from the fault log evaluation shall be highlighted. Firstly if
steep terrain is expected, a higher altitude over ground should be selected, in order to avoid
contact with the seabed. Secondly it should be assured that the mission abort voltage is
chosen high enough, so that enough time is available to recover the AUV. This time strongly
dependents on the conditions at the site and environmental influences and thus should be
decided individually for each mission at the site.
8.2. Data availability
As became obvious from the beginning and throughout the risk assessment only few statistical
data for AUV reliability is available. Judgment from experts can also be difficult, especially
when little experience with judgment processes and the operation to be judged is available.
One idea that was already expressed earlier by others is a common database for AUV faults
and incidents. In this respect an anonymous web based system for the REMUS 100 AUV
could be imagined . There is a large group of users of this AUV, thus all could benefit from
the common experience. Incidents, such as loss or major damages, could be reported and
together with some measure of total or relative operation time lead to statistical significant
data for quantitative risk assessment. The system could be similar to the OREDA offshore
reliability database or the sea-web accident database. Setting up this database would require
a lot of effort from all parties, but likewise all could profit from it.
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A. Risk identification - PHA
In the following pages the PHA sheets that were filled out during the assessment are presented.
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B. Risk analysis
B.1. HRA supplementary material
IX
B. Risk analysis
Table B.1.: Dependency condition table (NUREG/CR-6883, 2005)
B.2. Summary fault log analysis
In the following table all the faults are listed with a description. Some of the descriptions
were taken directly from Griffiths et al. (2009), these passages are explicitly marked.
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B. Risk analysis
B.3. Detailed HRA summary
In the following the detailed summary of the HRA from the experts is presented. It includes
all assessed probabilities, dependency assessments and calculations.
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C. Risk treatment
C.1. Revised event trees
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D. Risk management framework
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This document is the risk management framework for the risk management process of the 
AUV REMUS 100 belonging to the AUR Lab of NTNU Trondheim. It will give an outline on 
how to carry out risk assessments and how to use them. The Risk Management process is 
established following the risk management standard ISO 31000. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The AUR Lab of NTNU operates the unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) owned by 
NTNU. Operations include use of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) and remotely 
operated underwater vehicles (ROV) in the fjords of Norway. While the Trondheimsfjord is 
the main area of use also other regions are used, such as Spitsbergen. Operation takes 
place in a corrosive medium, strong currents and rapidly changing weather conditions, which 
form a hazardous environment.  
During operation the operators and assets are vulnerable in this environment. NTNU 
emphasizes a proactive approach towards risk and safety. As part of NTNU, the AUR Lab 
should implement a proactive approach to manage the risks, so that the hazard will not 
manifest in an incident with unwanted outcome.   
1.2 Scope 
The scope of this framework is to give tools for risk assessment to the AUR Lab to assess 
and monitor the risk of the AUR Lab’s UUV operation. The risk management is built on the 
ISO 31000 (2009) standard.  
The risks, hazards, tools and methods are noted, only intended for record keeping of proven 
methods. Other methods should be used if more applicable in order to advance risk 
management and assessments. Chapters 3 and 4 are intended as way to record the 
methods that were used and experiences that where made with them. This shall facilitate 
selection of applicable methods in the future. 
1.3 Terms and definitions 
1.3.1 Risk  
The following risk definition shall apply in this document: 
“[Risk is] the combined answer to three questions: (1) What can go wrong? (2) What 
is the likelihood of that happening? What are the consequences?” (Rausand, 2011) 
The Risk picture then represents the risk qualitatively and shows the dimensions and 
elements of risk (Rausand, 2011). This summarizes hazards, associated consequences and 
likelihood. 
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1.3.2 Hazard 
A hazard is a “potential source of harm” (NORSOK Z-013, 2010). The harm may be “loss of 
life, damage to health, the environment, or assets, or a combination of these” (NORSOK Z-
013, 2010). A hazardous event describes the event when a hazard is released (NORSOK Z-
013, 2010). 
1.3.3 Failure and fault 
A failure is defined as: 
“Termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function.” (NORSOK Z-
016, 1998) 
A failure is therefore an event. After a failure occurred the item has a fault, which is then the 
state of the item. A fault is often the result of a failure but may exist without one (NORSOK 
Z-016, 1998). A fault can be defined as: 
“State of an item characterized by inability to perform a required function, excluding 
the inability during preventive maintenance or other planned actions, or due to lack of 
external resources.” (NORSOK Z-016, 1998)  
Faults and failure are important in connection with reliability and risk in AUV operation, since 
frequent failures imply a low reliability. A low reliability might increase the probability of loss, 
thus increasing the risk. 
1.3.4 Barriers 
Barriers are defined as physical or engineered systems or human actions (based on specific 
procedures or administrative controls) that are implemented to prevent, control, or impede 
energy released from reaching the assets and causing harm (Rausand, 2011). Often the 
term risk mitigating measures or risk reducing measures (RCM) are used synonymously.   
1.3.5 Risk management 
Risk management is the framework, procedures and processes, the architecture of how to 
manage risk. Whereas managing risk is the process of applying the framework to particular 
risks (ISO 31000, 2009).  
The risk management process comprises five steps which are interlinked. These steps are 
establishing of context, risk assessment, risk treatment, communication and consultation and 
monitoring and review. The latter two link the steps together and assure continuous 
improvement of risk (ISO 31000, 2009).  
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The process described in ISO31000 (2009) is depicted in Figure 1. Communication and 
consultation takes a major role, it shall ensure that experts from different fields are consulted 
to ensure identification of all risks and hazards.  
Establishing the context is the process where scope, purpose and goals are described. Risk 
assessment consists of three steps: Risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. 
During risk identification hazards are reviewed and the possible harm is identified. Risk 
analysis identifies mechanisms, how the hazards might manifest and if the risk is relevant in 
the established context. Risk evaluation identifies the level of risk and gives input for 
decision making and risk treatment (ISO 31000, 2009). 
 
Figure 1 Risk management process described in ISO 31000 (ISO 31000, 2009) 
During risk treatment measures are identified to reduce the risk of relevant risk contributors 
as much as possible. The principle that the risk should be reduced as long as it can be 
proven that the associated effort is disproportional high should always be applied (ISO 
31000, 2009). Through the constant process of monitoring and review the risk level should 
be constantly reduced, by reassessing the risk with the knowledge gained in the meantime.  
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2 Implementation of risk management 
The risk management system is summarized in Figure 2. It shall show links between 
different actors in the system and their roles. The risk management framework is the central 
point of the risk management system.  
2.1 Responsibilities 
Head of the AUR Lab is Professor Harald Ellingsen. Martin Ludvigsen, as head of operations 
of the AUR Lab, is responsible for planning and organisation of research cruises with UUV.  
So far no risk management responsible has been assigned. This person is in charge of 
organisation of risk assessments, preparation and conduction, with the resources necessary. 
The person is also responsible for updating and monitoring the risk assessments and risk 
management, based on the findings, experience and input gathered since the last update. 
Decisions, e.g. measures to reduce risk or other operation patterns, based on the risk 
assessments have to be made by the heads of AUR Lab and if necessary by the head of the 
research mission and other relevant parties involved in the operation, such as the crew of 
Gunnerus, external participants etc. 
2.2 Communication and cooperation 
For the risk assessments and risk management system the risk management responsible is 
the key figure in communication. It is his responsibility to communicate the importance of a 
risk management system and the advantages. Additionally he is responsible to identify 
experts needed for risk assessments and review of the system. 
All parties involved in UUV operation should be involved in the risk assessment as needed, 
such as, among others, the head of operation, technicians, mission operators, support 
vessel operators and external stakeholders in the operation and mission.  
The risk management responsible should ensure that meetings are scheduled in such a way 
that the aim can be reached efficiently and in the time planned. The head of daily operation 
should support the risk management responsible as far as possible in the organisation.  
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2.3 Monitoring and review of risk and risk management  
The risk itself should be monitored. Incidents should be recorded and relevant risk 
assessments reassessed. The reassessment should reflect experiences made and also 
reflect changes in operation and hazards. The statistics should also show if the risk found is 
over- or underestimated. This can only be made to some extent, since few operations are 
carried out per year which might easily be mistaken for a high safety level though the data is 
not statistically precise. 
Monitoring of the risk level can also be done by recording of faults of the UUV. From these 
faults shortcomings in planning, maintenance or software might be derived. A way to extract 
faults from the REMUS 100 is described later.  
2.4 Review of the management system 
The management system, along with this document should be kept updated and revised. 
This should be done on a regular basis to ensure that gained experience is saved and 
available for others and later use. For the review process all parties involved in recent or 
ongoing risk assessments and operation should be involved to gain a comprehensive 
impression where improvements can be made.  
An adequate interval still has to be found. 
  
  
 
 
  
Figure 2 Risk management system interactions 
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3 Risk assessment methodology 
In the following part methods shall be shortly described which can be part of the risk 
assessment. References are made to further literature which explains the methods in more 
detail. For a more detailed information ISO 31000 (2009) should be consulted.  
3.1 Context 
In this part the aim of the risk assessment is defined. This includes objectives, scope, risk 
criteria and external and internal parameters. External and internal parameters should be 
described in more detail and better evaluated than described in this framework. (ISO 31000, 
2009) 
3.1.1 External context 
The external context can include, among other topics (ISO 31000, 2009): 
 The environment in which operation is taking place, e.g. legal, regulatory, 
technological and natural 
 The setting of operation and consideration; international, national, regional or local 
 Trends and drivers that impact the objective the organization 
 External Stakeholders; their values, aims, perceptions and the relationship to them 
3.1.2 Internal context 
This part describes the internal environment in which the objectives shall be achieved. The 
values and organizational procedures of NTNU should be reflected in this part. The internal 
context can include among others (ISO 31000, 2009): 
 Organizational structure, roles and accountabilities 
 Objectives and strategies to achieve them 
 Capabilities, resources and knowledge available for the risk management; E.g. 
capital, time, people, processes, systems  and technologies 
 Internal stakeholders, relationships between them and their values 
 Information systems and flow and the decision making process 
 Standards, guidelines and methods in use 
3.1.3 Defining risk criteria 
Criteria for risk assessment should be defined before the actual risk assessment is 
conducted. They should reflect resources available, objectives and values. Some can be 
derived from laws and regulations. They should be regularly reviewed and be reflected in the 
risk management. Factors to be considered for risk criteria are listed below (ISO 31000, 
2009). 
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 Types of causes and consequences, their nature and how they can be measured 
 How likelihood is defined 
 Timeframe of likelihood and consequences 
 Determination of level of risk 
 Views and values of stakeholders 
 Possibility of combination of multiple risks and how they can be combined 
3.2 Risk identification 
For identification of risks and hazards, hazard checklists can be used (e.g. Rausand (2011)). 
Other sources include literature on risk in AUV operation and handbooks for underwater 
vehicles. 
The findings can be summarized in a PHA worksheet, where the hazards, preceding causes, 
resulting consequences and possible mitigating measures are identified. The worksheet also 
contains an estimation of the risk. Frequency or likelihood (abbreviated with Freq.) and 
consequences (Cons.) are sorted in categories. Possible categories are described in Table 1 
and Table 2, respectively. The risk is then calculated by adding frequency and 
consequences together, the so called risk priority number (RPN). A high RPN corresponds 
to a high risk.  
The worst cases are assumed, thus the most severe outcome or possible frequency is 
chosen when there are several categories involved. A detailed analysis of frequencies and 
possible outcomes is carried out during the risk analysis. The results can be summarized in 
a so called risk matrix, c.f. Table 3.  
Table 1 Frequency and likelihood categories, adopted from (Rausand, 2011) 
Category Rating Frequency Description 
Fairly normal 5 10 - 1 
Event that is expected to occur 
frequently 
Occasional 4 1 - 0,1 
Event that happens now and then and 
will normal be experienced 
Possible 3 10-1 - 10-3 Rare event, but will possibly experienced 
Remote 2 10-3 - 10-5 
Very rare event that will not necessarily 
be experienced 
Improbable 1 10-5 - 0 Extremely rare event 
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Table 2 Possible Consequence categories 
Category Rating Description 
Loss of AUV/  
Loss of life 
3 
The AUV is not able to surface, cannot be 
retrieved or is so severely damaged that further 
use is impossible 
Severe damage to 
AUV/ mission abort/ 
Severe injury 
2 
The AUV is damaged so severely that a 
mission/ cruise has to be aborted or is not 
started or all data collected is lost 
Small damage to 
AUV/ minor damage  
to health  
1 
The AUV is only damaged slightly and can be 
repaired during the cruise, within a short time, 
or data is lost only partially 
 
Table 3 Risk Matrix 
Probability 
Improbable Remote Possible Occasional 
Fairly  
normal Consequence 
Loss of AUV 4 5 6 7 8 
Severe damage/ 
mission abort 
3 4 5 6 7 
Small damage 2 3 4 5 6 
 
3.3 Risk analysis 
3.3.1 Modelling of risk 
3.3.1.1 Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
FTA is a tool to identify all combinations of basic hazardous events that may result in a 
critical event for the system (Rausand, 2011). This can be done qualitatively and 
quantitatively. The analysis is a graphical method based on Boolean logic and event gates. 
The top event is described by a combined answer to: What happens in the event? Where 
does it take place? At which time? (Rausand, 2011). In a FTA only one top event at a time 
can be analysed. Additionally multiple failures at a time can only be included, if a basic event 
is created for this purpose. 
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The most important gates are and - gates, the event happens if all sub events occur, and or - 
gates, the event happens if one of the sub events occurs. With the graphic representation of 
the interaction of the basic events it is easily possible to identify short comings in the system 
(Rausand, 2011). If a quantitative approach is chosen it is possible to calculate the top event 
probability. Basic events are the lowest events considered in the FTA and represent a 
certain resolution of analysis (Rausand, 2011).  
For FTA analysis the tool CARA Fault Tree v.4.02b can be used. With the program, fault 
trees can easily be drawn, with standard symbols and their logic already stored in the library.  
3.3.1.2 Event tree analysis (ETA) 
ETA is a graphical approach which is set up left to right, whereas it starts from the 
hazardous events (e.g. the top event of a FTA) and splits at stages, the stages are often 
described as a barrier failure (Rausand, 2011). It can also be significant events that may 
arise during an event chain. The event is either true or false, and each is associated with a 
certain probability. In a graphical way a true barrier failure propagates horizontal, where the 
false event branches downwards. On the right side of the event tree the consequences and 
the cumulative probability are listed, representing the risk arising from the specific hazardous 
event.  
The Event trees can easily be drawn in Microsoft Excel, including the calculations for the end 
event probabilities. Other commercial solutions are also available. The end event 
probabilities in an ETA are found by multiplying the probabilities along the event path with 
each other. The sum of all end event probabilities equals the probability of the hazardous 
event.  
3.3.2 Modelling of event probabilities 
In order to gather basic event probabilities for the above mentioned analyses several tools 
can be used. Some will be described below.  
3.3.2.1 Statistical data 
Data of incidents or faults that were recorded can be used to find probabilities. One premise 
is that data is sampled regularly and enough data is collected.  
To extract failure data from the REMUS 100, the control software can be used. A mission file 
has to be selected and loaded in the program. In the task bar, in the menu “Export” the 
option “Export fault log” is available. The user is asked upon selection to define a destination 
and name, after saving the fault log for the mission is saved in .txt format.  
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The format is similar to a comma separated value (.csv) –file and thus can be analysed 
automatically by a script in mathematical processing software. Fault recording should also 
include a time/ distance notation for statistical evaluation.  
With this data available, the criticality of the events should be assessed, often the messages 
are mere warnings, which are not relevant for the risk. For the critical events a distribution 
can be chosen to assess the frequency or probability of occurrence. For a large amount of 
reoccurring faults a Weibull distributions might be used. With the parameters different 
function characteristics can be modelled.  For less reoccurring events the Kaplan Meier 
estimator might be more adequate. For more information it is referred to the literature. 
3.3.3 Expert estimation of probabilities 
Expert estimation of probabilities is recommended if no or few data is available. Through 
involvement of several experts it is believed that a probability close to the “real” probability 
can be assessed. So far one simple assessment method was used which applied a verbal-
probabilistic-scale, described by (Witteman & Renooij, 2003).  
Another method which is more advanced is the SHELF v2.0 method (Oakley J. E. and 
O'Hagan, 2010), which was already successfully used for estimation of probabilities in 
context with AUV operation (Griffiths, et al., 2009). 
A variety of more methods is available, it is referred here to two review papers, one from the 
U.S. Army (Ayyub, 2000) and a thorough review for different sectors of application 
(Jenkinson, 2005).  
3.3.3.1 Human reliability analysis  
Several methods for human reliability analysis (HRA) exist. So far the Spar-H method was 
used. The method was developed by US nuclear energy authorities and is described in 
NUREG/CR-6883 (2005). But as was found out during the first risk assessment, it has also 
some shortcomings in relation to modelling of interconnection of events. It requires a lot of 
clarification work in the beginning to instruct the analysts, otherwise misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations might result.   
In the following some more general methods will be presented, which might be worth 
consideration instead (Rausand, 2011): 
 THERP (Technique for human error prediction) 
o Widely used and well documented method 
o Can be resource intensive and requires high level of detail 
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 HEART (Human error assessment and reduction technique) 
o Does not require high level of skill or knowledge in HRA 
o Quick and straight forward use 
o No modelling of dependencies 
o Subjective perspective of analyst is having an influence 
 CREAM (Cognitive reliability and error analysis method) 
o Considering context 
o Well-structured and systematic 
o Resource intensive and overwhelming for new users 
o Requires knowledge in human factors and cognitive psychology 
3.3.3.2 Data from other publications 
Only few data from published literature is available. For the REMUS 100 one thorough 
analysis was conducted and published (Griffiths, et al., 2009). It is believed that the AUR Lab 
can profit from the experiences described and built on the knowledge presented there. 
3.4 Risk treatment 
The risk treatment should consist of three parts. 
1. Identification of high risk contributors 
2. Identification of risk reduction measures (RCM) 
3. Re-evaluation of the risk and decision making 
Identification of high risk contributors can be a straight forward task, depending on the model 
used. It should be kept in mind that all the events have a certain level of uncertainty. Events 
with a high probability and associated high uncertainty should be closer investigated first, 
reducing the uncertainty, by collecting further data. 
Identification of risk reduction measures should be conducted in cooperation with the experts 
already involved in the assessment and if necessary further experts should be consulted. It 
is important to quantify the impact of the measures. Methods for reduction assessment could 
be, among others, HRA, expert estimation or data from publications.  
The reduced probabilities then can be used to re-assess the risk. This should be done 
individually for each RCM proposed or in feasible groups to assess if the risk reduction effort 
results in an accordingly high risk reduction. Thus a risk reduction to effort factor should be 
defined beforehand. This limit is often expressed as the difference in risk over the cost of 
implementing the RCM. 
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4 Hazards and risks of concern 
In the following chapter some remarks will be made, which hazards and risks might be 
relevant. The list is in no case complete and should be enhanced when new hazards are 
identified or arise.  
4.1 Risk 
Normally three types of risks are analysed: 
 Risk to humans 
o Loss of life 
o Injuries 
o Permanent damages to health 
o Loss of life or damage to third party people 
 Risk to assets 
o Loss of the AUV 
o Damage to the AUV 
o Loss or incomplete mission results 
o Loss of equipment 
o Damage to equipment 
o Damage to assets not belonging to the AUR 
 Risk to the environment 
o Hazardous materials leaking to the environment 
o Release of hazards/ hazardous material due to interaction with other assets  
4.2 Hazards 
The following hazards might be considered in risk assessments, it is recommended to use 
additional checklists, a rather brief checklist of hazards can be found in (Rausand, 2011). It 
might also be worthwhile to look into operational handbooks and literature on AUV reliability 
and incidents.  
 Mechanical hazards 
o Kinetic energy 
o Acceleration/ retardation 
o Potential energy 
o Sharp edges/ points 
o Vacuum 
o Moving/ rotating parts 
o Stability/ toppling problems 
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o Material degradation; corrosion, wear, fatigue, etc. 
 Dangerous materials 
o Flammable 
o Explosive 
o Corrosive 
 Electrical hazards 
o Electromagnetic hazard 
o Electrostatic hazard 
o Short circuit 
o Overload 
 Thermic hazard 
o Flame  
o Explosion 
 Environmental hazards 
o Lightning  
o Storm  
o Fog 
o Sea state 
 Hazards through neglected ergonomic principles 
o Unhealthy postures, excessive effort required 
o Mental overload or underload, stress 
o Human error, human behaviour 
 Organizational Hazards 
o Safety culture 
o Maintenance (less than adequate) 
o Competence (less than adequate) 
 Interaction Hazards 
o Electromagnetic interference or incompatibilities 
o Hardware and software control 
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